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Abstract
A closer look at some proposed Gedanken-experiments on BECs promises
to shed light on several aspects of reduction and emergence in physics. These
include the relations between classical descriptions and different quantum treat-
ments of macroscopic systems, and the emergence of new properties and even
new objects as a result of spontaneous symmetry breaking.
1 Introduction
Not long after the first experimental production of a Bose-Einstein condensate
(BEC) in a dilute gas of rubidium in 1995(1), experiments demonstrated interfer-
ence between two such condensates(2). Interference is a wave phenomenon, and
here it was naturally taken to involve a well-defined phase difference between
two coherent matter waves—the BECs themselves. Experimental phenomena
associated with well-defined phase-differences were already familiar from other
condensed matter systems. The alternating current observed across a Joseph-
son junction between two similar superconductors was (and is) explained by
appeal to their varying phase-difference induced by a constant voltage difference
across the junction. These two phenomena are now considered manifestations of
quantum behavior at the macroscopic—or at least mesoscopic—level since they
involve very large numbers of atomic or sub-atomic systems acting in concert,
and it is the theory of quantum mechanics that has enabled us to understand
and (at least in the second instance) to predict them, both qualitatively and in
quantitative detail. They are among a variety of phenomena manifested by con-
densed matter that have been described as emergent(3),(4), in part as a way of
contrasting them with phenomena amenable to a reductive explanation in terms
of dynamical laws governing the behavior of their microscopic constituents.
While some kind of contrast with reduction is almost always intended
by use of the term ‘emergent’ (or its cognates), the term has been widely applied
to items of many categories on diverse grounds. After briefly commenting in
section 2 on philosophers’ attempts to regiment usage, I focus on a cluster
of issues surrounding the emergence of a definite phase in BECs and related
systems.
It is widely (though not universally) believed that the concept of broken
symmetry is key to understanding not only the Josephson effect and interference
of BECs but also many other phenomena involving condensed matter.
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When the state of a condensate is represented by a mathematical ob-
ject with U(1) symmetry, spontaneous breaking of this symmetry is associated
with a definite phase—the complex argument of an order parameter such as the
expectation-value of a field operator. It may be said that this phase emerges
as a result of such spontaneous symmetry breaking. Analogies are often drawn
between this spontaneously broken phase symmetry and the breaking of rota-
tional symmetry as the magnetization of a Heisenberg ferromagnet or the axis
of a crystal acquires a definite orientation. But the attribution of a definite
value for the phase of a condensate raises a thicket of problems that challenge
these analogies.
While the orientation of a crystal or a Heisenberg ferromagnet has di-
rect operational significance, it is at most the relative phase of two or more
condensates that is manifested in interference experiments: the absolute phase
of a condensate is generally taken to be without physical significance. A second
issue concerns measurements of the relative phase of condensates. In quantum
mechanics, a measurable magnitude (an “observable”) is represented by a self-
adjoint operator, and the possible results of a measurement of this observable
are given by the spectrum of this operator. But there are powerful reasons
for denying that observables generally have values for measurement to reveal.
If the relative phase were represented by such an operator, then the appear-
ance of a definite (relative) phase on measurement is no indication of a definite
pre-existing phase in the condensate. Rather than emerging spontaneously, the
definite phase would be precipitated by the measurement itself.
A number of recent papers have treated the emergence of a definite
relative phase between BECs as a stochastic physical process that occurs as a
result of multiple measurements of quantum observables, each on a different
microscopic constituent of the BECs(5)−(11). The measured observable is not
the phase itself, so there is no need to represent this by an operator. Indeed,
as section 4 explains, the emerging relative phase plays the role of a kind of
“hidden variable” within a standard quantum mechanical analysis. This anal-
ysis involves no appeal to spontaneous symmetry-breaking. While some have
embellished the analysis by explicit appeal to von Neumann’s controversial pro-
jection postulate (“collapse” of the wave-function on measurement), this proves
unnecessary: all that is required is standard Schro¨dinger quantum mechanics,
including the Born rule for joint probabilities. One way to look at this quantum
mechanical analysis is as a reduction of the theoretical treatment of relative
phase in terms of spontaneous symmetry-breaking. But this reduction would
also involve elimination, in so far as it assumes there is no well-defined relative
phase prior to the measurements that prompt its emergence.
A striking feature of the quantum mechanical analysis is that macro-
scopic values for observables also emerge in the stochastic process that produces
a well-defined relative phase. These include transverse spin polarization in a re-
gion occupied by two BECs, each composed of particles with aligned spins,
where the two alignments are in opposite directions. The measurements that
induce this macroscopic spin polarization are themselves microscopic, and may
occur in a distant region. As section 5 explains, this “nonlocal” emergence
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of macroscopic values violates expectations based on a common understanding
of the Copenhagen interpretation, and has been presented as a strengthening
of EPR’s challenge to that interpretation(12). Section 6 considers a possible
Bohrian response to this challenge and explains why this is in tension with the
common view that the classical features of macroscopic objects may be derived
from quantum theory. This may prompt one to question the reduction of clas-
sical to quantum physics.
For a global U(1) symmetry, Noether’s first theorem implies the exis-
tence of a conserved quantity, which may in this case be identified with the num-
ber of bosons present in a condensate. Broken global U(1) symmetry then ap-
parently implies a condensate composed of an indeterminate number of bosons.
While coherent laser light has long been accepted as an example of a condensate
with an indeterminate number of massless bosons, an indeterminate number of
atoms in a BEC/Cooper pairs in a superconductor threatens cherished beliefs
about conservation of mass, and baryon/lepton number. Section 7 addresses
the question: Do we have here an emergent object—an object not composed of
any definite number of its constituents?
The present paper attempts no more than a preliminary survey of a
cluster of complex interrelated issues concerning reduction and emergence in
Bose-Einstein condensates, each of which will repay detailed further study.
2 Emergence and Reduction
In physics and elsewhere, reduction and emergence are characteristically taken
to label opposing views of a single relation, but lack of clarity about the nature
of the relation and the identities of the relata often results in debates between
“reductionists” and their opponents that generate more heat than light. One
problem is that while it is typically phenomena, behavior, properties, objects,
etc. that are said (or denied) to be emergent, reduction is more commonly
thought of as a relation between theories, theoretical descriptions, sciences or
laws (strictly, law statements). So while emergence is a relation that may or
may not hold between items in the world that scientists study, reduction is a
relation applicable only to products of that study. This division is not hard and
fast1. But it is a division I shall respect in my usage in this paper.
In their attempts to clarify the notion of emergence, philosophers have
typically begun by concentrating their efforts on the emergence of properties.
No consensus has been reached, and a number of alternative analyses have been
proposed(14)−(17). Rather than take these as rival attempts to state neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of the term ‘emergent
property’, one should view them as alternative explications of the same rough
1In his qualified defense of reductionism, Weinberg(13) casts reduction and even reductive
explanation in ontological rather then epistemological or methodological terms. He freely
admits that a scientist’s best strategy in understanding a phenomenon is often not to look to
the fundamental laws that govern the elementary constituents of the systems involved, even
while maintaining that it is those laws that “ultimately explain” it.
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idea—that an emergent property is one that is somehow autonomous from more
elementary underlying structures out of which it arises. Each may prove useful
in marking some contrast that is important in a different application. One com-
mon application of the notion of emergence is to the mind: philosophers and
cognitive scientists have debated the emergence of consciousness and other men-
tal properties from underlying physical processes involving the brain. But here
I am interested in contrasting specific physical properties (or, in one case, ob-
jects) with others as to their autonomy from or dependence on more elementary
physical structures.
The phase of a condensate is the first such property, and the underlying
structures are the properties and arrangement of its constituent particles. The
phase of a condensate is actually a real-valued magnitude, though any qualita-
tive (i.e. non-numerical) property may be so regarded—it’s values may be taken
to be 1 (for possessed) and 0 (for not possessed). Other magnitudes of systems
of condensates may also be considered emergent, including spin polarization,
magnetization and electric current. We shall see that not one but several senses
of emergence turn out to be usefully applied to these properties.
Broken symmetries associated with phase transitions in condensates
have been taken to give rise to emergent phenomena by both physicists and
philosophers(3),(4),(16),(18)2. Weinberg(19) even defines a superconductor as “sim-
ply a material in which electromagnetic gauge invariance is spontaneously bro-
ken”. This at least suggests that it is spontaneously broken symmetry that
marks properties of matter as emergent in a novel phase. If so, properties of
matter in that phase that can be accounted for without appealing to broken
symmetry would not count as emergent.
In one sense, emergence is a diachronic process rather than a synchronic
condition. Phase transitions occur as dynamical processes, whether or not the
symmetry of the prior state is physically broken during this process. So a phase
of matter with striking properties may emerge dynamically even though these
properties are not sufficiently autonomous from the underlying structure in the
new phase to count as (synchronically) emergent.
I think there is another possible use of ‘emergent’, as applied to prop-
erties of a complex system which is, perhaps, illustrated by the emergence of a
definite (relative) phase in BECs. Consider such “sensory” predicates as red,
malodorous, bitter, silky or even wet or hard3. In paradigm cases, though cer-
tainly not always, these are applied to a macroscopic object on the basis of the
response it elicits in a human who interacts with that object in a minimally
invasive way—unfortunately, looking at a red traffic light is not an effective way
to turn it green, and nor does sniffing rotten meat improve its smell. But do
such predicates pick out a corresponding property of that object?
2Though Anderson(18) doesn’t use the word ‘emergent’. It is an unfortunate linguistic
accident that in the expression ‘phase transition’ the word ‘phase’ refers to states of matter
themselves (e.g. superconducting), not to the complex argument of a parameter that may be
used to characterize their degree of order.
3See Wilson’s(20) extended exploration of the sensory concomitants of the first and last of
these terms and their bearing on the character of any corresponding property.
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Many and varied answers to that question have been proposed through-
out the history of philosophy and natural science. Some have defended a positive
answer by claiming that a property such as the redness of an object supervenes
on more fundamental properties of the microscopic constituents of that object
that are not themselves red. Others have denied the existence of any property
of redness, flushed with the prospect of a complete scientific explanation of our
ability to perceive, classify and reliably communicate about those things we call
red based only on their fundamental microphysical properties and ours. Philo-
sophical accounts of emergence generally presuppose that emergent properties
are real, even if they supervene on an underlying microphysical basis. But if
one had a complete scientific explanation of our ability to perceive, classify and
reliably communicate about those things we call red, that might itself be offered
as an account of the emergence of redness even if there is no such property! For
the account would explain the success of our common practice of calling things
red and so license the continuance of that practice.
3 BEC Phase as Emerging from Spontaneous
Symmetry Breaking?
In his seminal essay Anderson(18) takes the general theory of broken symmetry
to offer an illuminating formulation of how the shift from quantitative to qual-
itative differentiation characteristic of emergence takes place4. In agreement
with Weinberg(19) he mentions superconductivity as a spectacular example of
broken symmetry, though he gives several others.
The essential idea is that in the so-called N →∞ limit of large
systems (on our own, macroscopic scale) it is not only convenient but
essential to realize that matter will undergo sharp, singular “phase
transitions” to states in which the microscopic symmetries, and even
the microscopic equations of motion, are in a sense violated. (op.
cit. p.395)
After the 1995 experimental production of BECs in dilute gases, Laughlin
and Pines(3) were able to add “the newly discovered atomic condensates” as
examples that display emergent physical phenomena regulated by higher or-
ganizing principles. Since they cite Anderson’s paper approvingly and take a
principle of continuous symmetry breaking to explain (the exact character of)
the Josephson effect, it is reasonable to conjecture that they would join Ander-
son in taking the phase transition from a normal dilute gas to a BEC as well
as that from a normal metal to a superconducting state to involve spontaneous
symmetry breaking.
What symmetry is taken to be broken in the transition to the con-
densed phase of a BEC? The transition is from a less to a more ordered state,
whose order may be represented by a so-called order parameter. According to
4“at each level of complexity entirely new properties appear” ((18), p.393).
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Leggett(21) (p. 38) the order parameter characterizing a BEC (especially in the
case of dilute gases including rubidium) is often taken to be a complex-valued
function—the expectation value of a Bose field operator in the given quantum
state.
Ψ (r,t) =
〈
ψˆ (r,t)
〉
(1)
If this is written as
Ψ (r,t) = |Ψ(r,t)| eiϕ(r,t) (2)
then the phase ϕ (r,t) parametrizes an element of the group U(1). If the equa-
tions describing the field of the condensate are symmetric under global U(1)
transformations, then changing the order parameter by addition of an arbitrary
constant to the phase will take one solution into a distinct solution. Global U(1)
symmetry will be broken by choice of one such value.
An analogy is often drawn to the broken rotation symmetry of the
Heisenberg ferromagnet as the spins of all its magnetic dipoles align along some
arbitrary direction in the ground state. That fits Anderson’s quoted description
well, since the phase transition to one such highly ordered ground state of the
ferromagnet is a good example of the kind of spontaneously broken symmetry
amenable to idealized treatment as a quantum system with an infinite number
of degrees of freedom5. In contrast to the case of a quantum system with a finite
number of degrees of freedom, degenerate ground states of such a system cannot
generally be superposed to give another state since they appear in distinct, uni-
tarily inequivalent, representations of the fundamental commutation relations.
Spontaneous breaking of the rotational symmetry of the Heisenberg ferromagnet
corresponds to the adoption of one out of the many states in which the dipoles of
the ferromagnet are all aligned. In two or more dimensions, this means breaking
of a continuous rotational symmetry. By Goldstone’s theorem(23), when such a
continuous symmetry is broken in quantum mechanics the Hamiltonian has no
energy gap6: in a quantum field theory this implies the existence of massless
Goldstone bosons.
Pursuing this analogy, spontaneous breaking of the continuous U(1)
phase symmetry of a BEC’s order parameter could be represented by an ideal-
ized model in which the number of constituent particles is taken to be infinite,
but the density of the BEC is fixed at some low value ρ by taking the so-called
thermodynamic limit N →∞, V →∞, N/V = ρ (a constant). Then adoption
of a definite phase by a BEC would be an instance of the same kind of sponta-
neous symmetry breaking as adoption of a definite direction of magnetization
by a Heisenberg ferromagnet. But there are problems with this analogy, as
Leggett(21),(25),(26) has noted.
When rotation symmetry of a Heisenberg ferromagnet is spontaneously
broken, the spins of its components are all aligned along a particular direction
in space. This direction may be operationally defined in many ways having
5See, for example, Ruetsche(22) .
6As Streater(24) proved for the Heisenberg ferromagnet: this gives rise to the possibility of
spin waves of arbitarily small energy.
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nothing to do with spin or magnetization: in particular, it need not be defined
in relation to other Heisenberg ferromagnets, either actual or hypothetical. On
the other hand, if the U(1) global phase symmetry of a BEC were to be spon-
taneously broken, its overall phase would become well defined only relative to
some other BEC of the same kind (for example, a similarly condensed dilute gas
of rubidium 87). At most, a definite phase consequent upon spontaneously bro-
ken symmetry would seem to be an emergent relational property (cf. Teller(27))
of a BEC. Moreover, difficulties in implementing multiple pairwise phase com-
parisons between similar BECs that have never been in contact threaten at least
the operational significance even of such a relational property. Leggett(26) ar-
gues that, at least in the case of superconducting BECs, operational pairwise
phase comparisons among several such BECs will fail to be transitive (though
compare Leggett(28)).
A second problem arises from the need to take the thermodynamic limit
to treat the emergence of relative phase in BECs as an instance of spontaneous
symmetry breaking. No massive BEC system is composed of an infinite number
of elementary bosons. Moreover, while the number of elementary dipoles in a
macroscopic magnet will typically at least be extremely large (of the order of
1023 ), the first dilute gas BECs contained only a few thousand atoms, and even
now experimental realizations have increased this number by only a few factors
of 10. If it were essential to assume that an infinite number of atoms is present in
each of two interfering BECs to explain their observed interference (as the quote
from Anderson might lead one to believe), then one may legitimately query the
value of the explanation. But in fact one need not treat the emergence of relative
phase here as a case of spontaneous symmetry breaking in the thermodynamic
limit, as analyses by Castin and Dalibard(6) and several subsequent authors
have shown.
In the context of an idealized model of two trapped condensates of the
same atomic species, Castin and Dalibard(6) showed two things:
(1) No measurements performed on the condensates can allow one to
distinguish between two different quantum representations of this system: By
a uniform average over the unknown relative phase of two coherent states; and
by a Poissonian statistical mixture of Fock states.
(2) Two different points of view on a system are available: Assuming an
initial pair of coherent states with a definite relative phase, successive measure-
ments “reveal” that pre-existing phase in an interference phenomenon; assuming
each condensate is initially represented by a definite Fock state, with no well-
defined relative phase, the same sequence of measurements progressively “builds
up” a relative phase between the condensates as the interference phenomenon
is generated.
They take the results of their analysis to show that the notion of sponta-
neously broken phase symmetry is not indispensable in understanding inter-
ference between two condensates. I won’t explain how they arrived at these
conclusions, since the next section outlines a closely related analysis by Laloe¨
of a similar Gedankenexperiment that will provide a focus for the subsequent
discussion. I will merely comment that Castin and Dalibard(6) assume that
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the measurements referred to in (2) are performed in a well-defined temporal
sequence on individual elements of the system of condensates, and that each
leaves the rest of the system in the quantum state it would be assigned if the
effect of that measurement were represented by von Neumann’s projection pos-
tulate.
4 The Appearance of PhaseWithout Symmetry-
Breaking
In 2005 Laloe¨(7) began to develop an elegant framework for analyzing the emer-
gence of phase in systems of BECs. One important application is to a system
of two BECs, each composed of non-interacting bosons, and each initially rep-
resented by a Fock state corresponding to a definite number of particles. This
provides a simplified and idealized model for the kind of experimental situation
realized by Andrews et. al.(2) that first demonstrated interference between two
BECs. An extension of that model is to measurements on BECs in different
internal states—most simply, each in one of two different one-particle z -spin
states. This enables one to consider the BECs to be initially separate systems
no matter what their spatial overlap: and it naturally suggests the possibility
of a variety of different kinds of measurement capable of revealing interference
between them—of spin-component in any direction in the x-y plane. Such mea-
surements are considered in Mullin, Krotkov and Laloe¨(8), Laloe¨(12), and Laloe¨
and Mullin(10): here I follow Laloe¨’s(12) presentation.
Consider a pair of noninteracting spin-polarized BECs in the normalized
Fock state
|Φ〉 = 1√
Na!Nb!
aˆ†Naua,αaˆ†Nbvb,β |0〉 (3)
representing Na particles with internal (z-spin) state α and spatial state ua and
Nb particles with orthogonal internal (z-spin) state β and spatial state vb, where
|0〉 is the vacuum state.
If Ψˆα(r) is the field operator for z-spin α, Ψˆβ(r) for z-spin β, and
† indicates
the adjoint operation, then the number density operator of the BECs is
nˆ(r) = Ψˆ†α(r)Ψˆα(r) + Ψˆ
†
β(r)Ψˆβ(r) (4)
and the density operator for their spin component in a direction in the x − y
plane at an angle ϕ from the x-axis is
σˆϕ(r) = e
−iϕΨˆ†α(r)Ψˆβ(r) + e
+iϕΨˆ†β(r)Ψˆα(r) (5)
Suppose that one measurement is made of the ϕ-component of particle spin in
a small region of space ∆r centered around point r. The corresponding spin
operator is
Sˆ(r, ϕ) =
∫
∆r
d3r′σˆϕ(r
′) (6)
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For sufficiently small ∆r, this has only three eigenvalues η = 0,±1 since no
more than one particle would be found in ∆r. The single-particle eigenstates
for finding a particle there with η = ±1 are
|∆r, η〉 = |∆r〉 ⊗ 1√
2
[
e−iϕ/2 |α〉+ e+iϕ/2 |β〉
]
(7)
where |∆r〉 is a single-particle spatial state whose wave-function equals 1 inside
∆r but 0 everywhere outside ∆r. The corresponding N -particle projector is
Pˆη=±1(r,ϕ) =
1
2
∫
∆r
d3r′ [nˆ(r′) + ησˆϕ(r
′)] (8)
and the projector for finding no particle there is
Pˆη=0(r) =
(
1−
∫
∆r
d3r′nˆ(r′)
)
(9)
As ∆r → 0, the corresponding eigenstates (for variable r) form a quasi-complete
basis for the N -particle space.
Now consider a sequence of m measurements of transverse spin-components
ϕj in very small non-overlapping regions ∆rj , each of volume ∆, centered around
points rj (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Since the projectors for non-overlapping regions com-
mute, the joint probability for detecting m particles with spins ηj in regions
∆rj is 〈
Φ
∣∣∣Pˆη
1
(r1,ϕ1)× Pˆη2(r2,ϕ2)× ...× Pˆηm(rm,ϕm)×
∣∣∣Φ〉 (10)
Using (8) together with (4) and (5) this gives a product of several terms, each
containing various products of field operators. Since these commute, we can
push all the creation operators to the left and all the annihilation operators to
the right. Expanding the field operators in terms of a basis |ua, α〉, |vb, β〉 of
single particle states
Ψˆα(r) = ua(r) × aˆua,α + ... ; Ψˆβ(r) = vb(r) × aˆvb,β + ... (11)
But none of the ”dotted” terms will contribute to (10), since |Φ〉 contains no
particles in states other than |ua, α〉, |vb, β〉.
Each term now contains between 〈Φ| and |Φ〉 a string of creation operators
followed by a string of annihilation operators. If a state |ua, α〉 or |vb, β〉 does
not appear exactly the same number of times in each of these, it will not con-
tribute to (10): if it does appear exactly the same number of times in each of
these, every creation or annihilation operator will introduce a factor
√
Na,b − q
where q depends on the term but q < m. If m ≪ Na, Nb, these factors can
be approximated by
√
Na,b respectively. So now each field operator has been
replaced in (10) by a factor
√
Na,b multiplying a position wave-function ua or vb
(or its complex conjugate). But we still have to take account of particle number
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conservation in each sequence. This can be done by a clever trick, using the
mathematical identity
2pi∫
0
dΛ
2pi
einΛ = δn,0 (12)
By multiplying each Ψˆα(r) (or rather
√
Naua(r)) by e
iΛ, and each Ψˆ†α(r) (or
rather
√
Nau
∗
a(r)) by e
−iΛ, and integrating Λ over 2pi (and similarly for the b
particles), we automatically take account of particle number conservation!
Since ∆ is very small, the spatial wave-functions are each approximately
constant over each region ∆rj .The joint probability for detection of m particles
with spins ηj in regions ∆rj (1 < j < m), each of volume ∆, is then
∆m
Na!Nb!
2pi∫
0
dΛ
2pi
m∏
j=1
{
Na |ua(rj)|2 +Nb |vb(rj)|2+
ηj
√
NaNb
(
ei(Λ−ϕj)ua(rj)v
∗
b (rj) + c.c
) } (13)
or, with ξ(r) = arg [ua(r)/vb(r)],
∆m
Na!Nb!
2pi∫
0
dΛ
2pi
m∏
j=1
{
Na |ua(rj)|2 +Nb |vb(rj)|2+
2ηj
√
NaNb |ua(rj)| |vb(rj)| cos(Λ + ξ(rj)− ϕj)
}
(14)
Since we are interested in comparing relative probabilities of detection, the
prefixed normalization terms can now be dropped.
First consider the case m = 1: measurement of ϕ-spin on a single particle. If
Λ were fixed, these relative detection probabilities would be just what one would
expect from a state with a definite relative phase between the two condensates,
namely the (unnormalized) phase state
|Λ〉 =
[
N
1
2
a aˆ†ua,αe−iΛ/2 +N
1
2
b aˆ†vb,βeiΛ/2
]Na+Nb |0〉 (15)
with one-particle pure spin-state density matrix W proportional to(
Na |ua(r1)|2
√
NaNbe
−iΛu∗a(r1)vb(r1)√
NaNbe
iΛua(r1)v
∗
b (r1) Nb |vb(r1)|2
)
(16)
Moreover, the expectation value of z-spin in stateW is proportional toNa |ua(r1)|2−
Nb |vb(r1)|2, also just what one would expect if |Λ〉 represented the definite, pre-
existing relative phase between the condensates. But the uniform integral over
Λ ”washes out” the appearance of any definite phase relation between the two
condensates, so the overall probability distribution for measurement of ϕ-spin
on a single particle corresponds to no interference.
Now consider the case m = 2: joint measurement of ϕ1-spin and ϕ2-spin
with results η1, η2 respectively on two particles. The Λ-probability distribution
for result η2 conditional on outcome η1 is now weighted by a factor that depends
10
both on the angle ϕ1 of the measurement on particle 1 and on its outcome and
location (η1, r1) and is proportional to
Na |ua(r1)|2+Nb |vb(r1)|2+2η1
√
NaNb |ua(r1)| |vb(r1)| cos(Λ+ξ(r1)−ϕ1) (17)
This may well already give rise to a slight correlation between the results η1, η2:
if η1 is +1 and ϕ1 and ϕ2 are close, then η2 is more likely than not also to equal
+1. But as one considers additional transverse spin measurements, strong corre-
lations become apparent. The probability distribution for the transverse spin of
the (m+ 1)st particle conditional on outcomes ηj for the other m measurements
becomes strongly peaked as m increases. Laloe¨(12) comments
When more and more spin measurements are obtained, the Λ-distribution
becomes narrower and narrower....Standard quantummechanics con-
siders that Λ has no physical existence at the beginning of the series
of measurements, and that its determination is just the result of
a series of random perturbations of the system introduced by the
measurements. Nevertheless (14) shows that all observations are to-
tally compatible with the idea of a pre-existing value of Λ which is
perfectly well defined but unknown, remains constant, and is only
revealed (instead of created) by the measurements. (p. 43)
It is tempting to think of the emergence of a definite phase here as a stochas-
tic, dynamical process in which each subsequent transverse spin-measurement
(with increasing probability) renders the relative phase of the two condensates
more definite. But the parameter Λ enters the above quantum mechanical
analysis only as a convenient mathematical device for calculating conditional
probabilities, and not (as in (15)) as a way of characterizing the state of the
condensates themselves. Moreover, the analysis nowhere appealed to the evo-
lution of the state of the condensates, whether unitary (in accordance with the
Schro¨dinger equation) or non-unitary (in accordance with von Neumann’s pro-
jection postulate). Though if one were instead to assume a temporal sequence
of projective ϕj-spin measurements, then (neglecting Schro¨dinger evolution) the
state of the remaining condensate would progressively come to approximate a
state of definite phase.
5 A Strengthened EPR argument?
Laloe¨(12) goes on to consider alternative spatial wave-functions ua, vb for the
two condensates. He takes one such configuration to justify this claim in the
abstract to his paper.
We study in this article how the EPR argument can be transposed to
this case, and show that the argument becomes stronger, mostly be-
cause the measured systems themselves are now macroscopic. (p.35)
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He makes the simplifying assumption that ua, vb have the same phase at
each point r (though their amplitudes may differ) so ξ = 0. He then considers
an arrangement in which ua, vb overlap only in two distant regions A,B and m
successful transverse spin-measurements are considered in non-overlapping small
regions of A. The foregoing analysis shows that, for m ∼ 100, the conditional
probabilities for the outcomes of additional transverse spin-measurements in
small non-overlapping small regions of B will differ little from corresponding
unconditional probabilities for a phase state with some definite Λ (whose value
depends on the outcomes of the m measurements in A). In particular, if B
contains a macroscopic number of particles there will be some angle ϕΛ such
that each of, say, 1023 successful individual measurements of ϕΛ-spin on particles
in B is almost certain to give outcome ηΛ = +1, conditional on the outcomes
of the m measurements in A. Laloe¨(12) comments
Here we have a curious case where it is the measured system itself
that spontaneously creates a pointer made of a macroscopic number
of parallel spins. Moreover, for condensates that are extended in
space, ...this process can create instantaneously parallel pointers in
remote regions of space, a situation obviously reminiscent of the
EPR argument in its spin version given by Bohm. (p.37)
Recall Bohm’s spin version of the EPR Gedankenexperiment, featuring two
spin 12 particles in the spin singlet state
|ψs〉 =
1√
2
[|↑↓〉 − |↓↑〉] (18)
where ↑ (↓) labels a z-spin eigenvector with positive (negative) eigenvalue and
the order of the arrows in each component of the superposition corresponds to
that of the particles’ state spaces. Transposed to this situation, the intended
conclusion of the EPR argument is that quantum mechanical description is
incomplete since the state |ψs〉 does not describe certain ”elements of reality”
associated with each of these two particles: for each direction, one such ”element
of reality” corresponds to the (eigen)value of spin-component in that direction
which a well-conducted measurement of that spin component would reveal, were
one to be carried out.
After removing the excess erudition of which Einstein complained right after
its publication, the original EPR argument went like this7. Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen(29) assumed the following sufficient criterion for reality
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with cer-
tainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality correspond-
ing to this quantity. (p.777)
7In a letter to Schro¨dinger of June 19th, 1935 Einstein said that the main point was, so
to speak, overwhelmed by erudition (”die Hauptsache ist, sozusagen, durch Gelehrsamkeit
verschu¨ttet”).
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Suppose one were to get outcome η in a measurement of the (arbitrary)
ϕ-component of spin on particle a of a Bohm-EPR pair in spin state |ψs〉 at a
time when their spatial state corresponds to a, b being far apart (with negligible
probability of finding a outside A or b outside B, where A,B are widely sepa-
rated spatial regions). Assuming this is a projective measurement, the resulting
state is ∣∣ψ′〉 = ∣∣ϕηϕ−η〉 (19)
Applying the Born rule to
∣∣ψ′〉 one could predict with probability unity that
a (well-conducted) measurement of the value of the ϕ-component of spin on
particle b would yield outcome −η. EPR further take state ∣∣ψ′〉 to describe
b as certainly (with probability unity) having value −η for its ϕ-component
of spin even if no measurement is performed on b. Assuming (locality) that
such a hypothetical measurement on a alone would not disturb b, they infer
that in the hypothetical situation in which (only) a is measured with result η,
the ϕ-component of spin of b would be −η, prior to and independent of the
measurement on a: similarly, in the hypothetical situation in which (only) a is
measured with result −η, the ϕ-component of spin of b would be η, prior to
and independent of the measurement on a. Hence in any hypothetical situation
in which (only) a is measured, b would have had a definite (though as yet
unknown) ϕ-component of spin, prior to and independent of the measurement
on a. It follows that b always has a definite (though unknown) ϕ-component
of spin in the spin singlet state, irrespective of what measurement (if any)
one contemplates performing on a or b: by symmetric reasoning, so too does
a. Together with EPR’s necessary condition for completeness (”every element
of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory”) this
establishes the incompleteness of quantum mechanical description.
Laloe¨(12) takes his BEC Gedankenexperiment to strengthen the EPR argu-
ment ”mostly because the measured systems themselves are now macroscopic”.
In evaluating this claim later, it will be helpful to bear in mind a more straight-
forward extension of the Bohm-EPR scenario to the macroscopic scale, even
though the resulting Gedankenexperiment is so far beyond the bounds of prac-
ticality as to challenge credulity (cf. Schro¨dinger’s own reference to his infamous
cat scenario as ”ridiculous”)8. So consider a pair of spatially separated macro-
scopic systems a, b, composed of N ∼ 1023 spin 12 particles each, in an entangled
spin state |ψMac〉 of total z-component of angular momentum zero
|ψMac〉 =
1√
2
[|(N ↑) (N ↓)〉 − |(N ↓) (N ↑)〉] (20)
Applied to this scenario, the EPR reasoning would lead one to conclude that in
|ψMac〉 each of a, b has a definite macroscopic z-spin that quantum mechanics
fails to describe. To reach this conclusion, the argument would consider a hypo-
thetical measurement of the z-spin on a (a macroscopic object) and its outcome
8Schro¨dinger called Gedankenexperimenten like that of his eponymous cat ”burleske Fa¨lle”.
By contrast the Bohm-EPR Gedankenexperiment famously leant itself to implementation as
an actual experiment with profound results for quantum nonlocality.
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(a macroscopic value for the z-spin on a) to conclude—independent of any mea-
surements—that b has a definite macroscopic value of z-spin in state |ψMac〉.
Note that this argument need not involve consideration of measurements of any
other (incompatible) spin-component on a.
However elegant the argument, EPRs conclusion is now generally taken to
be mistaken, primarily because of Bell’s work and the subsequent experimental
violation of his eponymous inequalities. Now if EPR’s argument is valid but not
sound, which of their assumptions are false? Even after Bohr’s prompt refuta-
tion and extensive more recent discussions of quantum nonlocality, I believe
there is still no consensus on exactly how to answer that question. But I think
many would follow Gisin(30) in pinning the blame on EPR’s locality assump-
tions, taking the failure of quantum mechanics to satisfy all these assumptions to
show why some of its (verified) predictions violate Bell inequalities derived from
them. More specifically, the condition Shimony(31) called Outcome Indepen-
dence fails for quantum mechanics, as illustrated by the fact that the quantum
mechanical probability for outcome η of a measurement of ϕ-spin on a in the
Bohm EPR scenario conditional on a measurement of ϕ′-spin on b depends on
the outcome η′ of the latter measurement (though it does not depend on which
ϕ′-spin-component (if any) is measured on b if the outcome of any such mea-
surement is ignored). This failure of Outcome Independence does not facilitate
signalling between spacelike separated locations, and a variety of proofs have
been offered that quantum mechanical nonlocality is innocuous because it does
not permit such superluminal signalling.
But, as Maudlin(32) pointed out, there is still a problem reconciling quantum
mechanical nonlocality with relativity. Recall that, according to the EPR argu-
ment, a measurement on a projects |ψs〉 onto the state
∣∣ψ′〉 in which the ϕ-spin
of b is definite. EPR took this to be a straightforward application of quantum
mechanics itself, unlike their reality criterion and locality assumptions which
were motivated by more general physical considerations. If quantum mechani-
cal description is complete, in conflict with EPR’s conclusion, then the ϕ-spin of
b was not definite prior to the measurement on a. But if the a, b measurements
are spacelike separated events, then they have no invariant temporal order, and
any attempt to specify the spacetime location at which the ϕ-spin of b becomes
definite must appeal to structure not provided by a relativistic space-time and
hard to reconcile with it.
Despite this problem, Laloe¨(12) takes the analysis of his BEC Gedankenex-
periment to predict that spin-component measurements on a few microscopic
particles in A will immediately create a spontaneous transverse polarization of
a macroscopic assembly of spins in B.
what standard quantum mechanics describes here is not something
that propagates along the state and has a physical mechanism... it
is just ’something with no time duration’ that is a mere consequence
of the postulate of quantum measurement (wave packet reduction).
(p.45)
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In fact the analysis he has given does not even establish the claim that,
following these measurements in A, a single measurement of the total ϕ-spin in
B would (almost) certainly yield the predicted, definite macroscopic outcome.
For that analysis concerns only multiple (successful) microscopic measurements
of ϕ-spin on individual particles in specific tiny regions of B. But it is true that
successfully measuring the ϕ-spin of each of a macroscopic number of particles
within B and adding the results would be one way of measuring (a significant
portion of) the total ϕ-spin in B. Moreover, one can show that the expectation
value of total ϕ-spin in B will be macroscopic after even a single microscopic
transverse spin measurement in A. So it would be very surprising if an extension
of Laloe¨’s(12) analysis did not establish this claim.
How does the EPR argument apply to Laloe¨’s(12) BEC Gedankenexperiment,
in which the a, b condensates overlap only in remote regions A,B, a fewm ∼ 100
successful transverse spin-component measurements are performed in A, and a
macroscopic number of particles is present in B? Here is what he says
We have a situation that is similar to the usual EPR situation: mea-
surements performed in A can determine the direction of spins in
both regions A and B. If we rephrase the EPR argument to adapt
it to this case, we just have to replace the words ’before the mea-
surement in A’ by ’before the series of measurements in A’, but all
the rest of the reasoning remains exactly the same: since the el-
ements of reality in B cannot appear under the effect of what is
done at an arbitrary distance in region A, these elements of reality
must exist even before the measurements performed in A. Since the
double Fock state (3) of quantum mechanics does not contain any
information on the direction of spins in B, this theory is incomplete.
(p.46)
There is one clear disanalogy between the Bohm-EPR scenario and Laloe¨’s(12)
BEC Gedankenexperiment. Even if an individual spin-component measurement
is projective, the sequence of measurements performed in A does not collapse
the state (3) into an eigenstate of total ϕ-spin in B: at most it produces a
state of the BECs for which a measurement of total ϕ-spin in B is very likely
to give a particular result. Hence the EPR reality criterion cannot be applied
as stated, since it specifies probability unity. This disanalogy does not appear
for the macroscopic Bohm-EPR state |ψMac〉, which is in this respect a bet-
ter macroscopic generalization of the original Bohm-EPR state |ψs〉. Does this
disanalogy matter? I think it does.
Since they are arguing that quantum mechanical description is incomplete,
EPR need to have in mind a clear rival view of what it would be for it to be
complete. Quantum mechanics represents the (pure) state of systems by a wave-
function or state vector: how could such a mathematical object be considered to
offer a complete description of a system’s properties? A natural answer is that
given by the so-called eigenvalue-eigenstate link: observable O represented by
self-adjoint operator Oˆ has value oi on a system if and only if the state of that
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system can be represented by pure state |ωi〉 where Oˆ |ωi〉 = oi |ωi〉. Indeed,
EPR apply this link in both directions in section 1 of their paper. To adapt
EPR’s reasoning to Laloe¨’s(12) BEC Gedankenexperiment one would have to
modify it to avoid relying on the eigenvalue-eigenstate link.
Einstein’s own preferred variant on EPR9 does not rely on the eigenvalue-
eigenstate link. Instead it directly argues for incompleteness of description by
the wave-function. As applied to the Bohm-EPR scenario Einstein(34) would
reason that while a measurement of z-spin on a would collapse b’s state onto
an eigenstate of z-spin, a measurement of x-spin on a would collapse the state
of b onto an eigenstate of x-spin. By locality (”Grundsatz II” of Einstein(34)),
neither measurement could influence the real state of b, which would therefore be
the same no matter what measurement (if any) were performed on a. But there
is no way to understand both an x-spin eigenstate and a z-spin eigenstate as
offering a complete description of the same real state of b, since these eigenstates
imply radically different statistical predictions for the results of measurements
on b.
Einstein’s preferred mode of reasoning cannot be applied directly to Laloe¨’s(12)
BEC Gedankenexperiment. For even if the m transverse spin measurements on
particles in A are projective, they do not project the quantum state onto a pure
state that has the form of a tensor product, one factor of which has support
confined to B and so could be taken to describe just the contents of B.
Both the reasoning of the EPR argument and that of Einstein’s preferred
variant may, however, be readily applied to the macroscopic generalization of
Bohm-EPR represented by the state |ψMac〉, provided only that one takes the
conclusion to be the incompleteness of the description offered by |ψMac〉 of the
real state of b in that scenario. On the other hand, Laloe¨’s(12) BEC Gedanken-
experiment has the distinct advantage of not being totally beyond the bounds of
practicality. As he says, progress in experimental studies of dilute gas BECs may
bring us within reach of producing systems of condensates for whose quantum
mechanical modeling the double Fock state provides a reasonable idealization,
and whose temporal evolution does not render an analysis in terms of multiple
simultaneous measurements wholly irrelevant. Just as the Bohm-EPR scenario
is no longer merely a Gedankenexperiment, we may be on the verge of realizing
variants of Laloe¨’s(12) BEC Gedankenexperiment as real experiments.
6 What Bohr would (or should?) have said
Laloe¨(12) presents his Gedankenexperiment as a challenge to Bohr’s(36) refuta-
tion of the EPR argument in these words:
What is new here is that the EPR elements of reality in B corre-
spond to a system that is macroscopic. One can no longer invoke its
microscopic character to deprive the system contained in B of any
physical reality! The system can even be at our scale, correspond to
9For which, see Einstein ((33), pp. 340-2; (34), pp. 320-24; (35), pp. 82-87).
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a macroscopic magnetization that can be directly observable with a
hand compass; is it then still possible to state that it has no intrin-
sic physical reality? When the EPR argument is transposed to the
macroscopic world, it is clear that Bohr’s refutation does not apply
in the form written in his article; it has to be at least modified in
some way. (pp. 46-7)
On the contrary, I venture that Bohr’s reasoning in his refutation of EPR
applies equally well to Laloe¨’s(12) Gedankenexperiment. I say ”venture” rather
than ”claim” since any analysis based on an interpretation of just what Bohr
meant in his refutation must remain tentative. What follows may, with some
justification, be considered an attempt to put words into Bohr’s mouth that he
would never have let pass his lips!
In his refutation, Bohr(36) charged their reality criterion with fatal ambiguity.
The key passage is notoriously obscure, so I quote it at length.
Of course there is in a case like that considered no question of
a mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation during
the last critical stage of the measuring procedure. But even at this
stage there is essentially the question of an influence on the very
conditions which define the possible types of predictions regarding
the future behavior of the system. Since these conditions consti-
tute an inherent element of the description of any phenomenon to
which the term ’physical reality’ can properly be attached, we see
that the argumentation of the mentioned authors does not justify
their conclusion that quantum-mechanical description is essentially
incomplete. (p.700)
Note that Bohr here appears to deny that the flaw in the argument is the
falsity of EPR’s locality assumptions, while pointing to a different, and perhaps
deeper, problem with their assumptions about physical reality. The problem
is deeper in so far as the falsity of these assumptions would undermine the
applicability of notions of locality that rest on them. Note also that in the
quoted passage Bohr does not mention any division between microscopic and
macroscopic systems. Why, then would Laloe¨ suppose that his refutation is
based on the denial of any physical reality for microscopic systems that would
not apply equally to macroscopic systems?
The key phrase is surely that which Bohr himself stresses, namely ”the
very conditions which define the possible types of predictions regarding the future
behavior of the system”. What does Bohr think those conditions are? I believe
a close reading of the rest of his reply to EPR shows that what he has in mind
here are the experimental conditions set up by an experimenter who wishes to
perform the measurement in question. Moreover, this reading receives support
from others of Bohr’s writings. Bohr would insist that any consideration even
of a hypothetical measurement must be based on some specification of the ex-
perimental conditions in order to be well-grounded enough to play a role in an
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argument like that of EPR. His idea is that since any ascription of physical real-
ity to a quantity is meaningful only in a well-defined experimental context, the
element of reality EPR argue for cannot be detached from the (hypothetical)
experimental context in which it is initially inferred to play an independent role
in the argument, including its conclusion.
Bohr maintained that the experimental conditions must be specified in or-
dinary language, suitably enriched with the vocabulary of classical physics. In
his words (Bohr(37) )
it is decisive to recognize that however far the phenomena tran-
scend the scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all
evidence must be expressed in classical terms. The argument is sim-
ply that by the word ’experiment’ we refer to a situation where we
can tell others what we have done and what we have learned and
that, therefore, the account of the experimental arrangement and of
the results of the observations must be expressed in unambiguous
language with suitable application of the terminology of classical
physics. (p.209)
The main point here is the distinction between the objects under
investigation and the measuring instruments which serve to define,
in classical terms, the conditions under which the phenomena ap-
pear. (pp. 221-2)
It has often been assumed that the distinction to which Bohr refers here is
one based on size: that the apparatus is macroscopic, and so accurately treatable
by classical physics, while the object under investigation is microscopic, and so
must be treated quantum mechanically. That this assumption is false becomes
apparent when one reads the discussion in Bohr(37) of his debates with Einstein,
in which he applies quantum mechanics to macroscopic objects without even
feeling the need to comment on the fact.
The distinction Bohr has in mind is a pragmatic one: in order to apply
quantum mechanics to a system at all, he believes, one must describe the whole
experimental arrangement surrounding that system classically. That is true
whether the system under investigation is microscopic or macroscopic. But any
object that one (perforce) described classically when it figured in the experi-
mental arrangement for investigating some other system may itself be made
the system under investigation in the context of a different experimental ar-
rangement, in which case it would be legitimate to apply quantum mechanics
to it in that context, and even necessary if classical physics proved inadequate
to predict results of observing it in that context.
Bohr’s response to EPR did not rest on the denial of physical reality to iso-
lated microscopic systems. Instead, it rested on the denial of context-independent
attributions of properties (or rather physical quantities) to systems of any size.
He took this denial to be required by the transition to quantum physics from
classical physics. As he put it,
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The necessity of discriminating in each experimental arrangement
between those parts of the physical system considered which are to
be treated as measuring instruments and those which constitute the
objects under investigation may indeed be said to form a principal
distinction between classical and quantum-mechanical descriptions
of physical phenomena. ((36), p.701)
On my reading, this passage makes clear just how radical Bohr’s view of
quantum mechanical description was. In his view, with quantum mechanics,
all ascriptions of physical reality to properties of systems become contextual:
taken out of context, they lack significance. This denial of significance rests
on a pragmatist rather than a verificationist view of meaning10. To supply the
context needed to render meaningful the ascription of a property to a system
that one has decided to treat as ”an object under investigation” when applying
quantum mechanics, one must describe other surrounding systems classically.
This does not mean that those other systems are classical rather than quantum
mechanical. Still less does it mean that there is a special class of systems (”the
macroscopic systems”) which must be described classically. But it does mean
that there can be no purely quantum mechanical description of the world, or
even of any part of the world to which one contemplates applying quantum
mechanics. Laloe¨’s(12) BEC Gedankenexperiment helps to bring out this radical
character of Bohr’s view even though it does not challenge it. On Bohr’s view,
once one has decided to apply quantum mechanics to the system of BECs in
this Gedankenexperiment, even the ascription of a macroscopic magnetization
to part of that system in a region lacks significance, absent classically described
conditions external to the system. It may be hard to accept, but it is no refuta-
tion of this view, that bringing up a hand compass renders that ascription not
only meaningful but true.
This response to Laloe¨’s(12) BEC Gedankenexperiment has interesting im-
plications for the claim that classical physics (or parts of it, including classical
mechanics) is reducible to quantum physics (including quantum mechanics). If
one endorses the response, then one has strong grounds for denying such claims
of reducibility. According to classical physics, the behavior of a hand compass
near region B containing enough of the BEC system following 100 or so mea-
surements of transverse spin on particles in region A would warrant ascribing
a macroscopic magnetization to (the contents of) that region. Any reduction
of classical physics to quantum physics here would involve showing that this is
true11. But if one endorses (what I take to be) Bohr’s response, this is not true,
or even significant, outside of an appropriate context. So the most one could
10Here an analogy may be helpful. Consider the following message carved on a tree-trunk
deep in a forest: ”I’ll meet you here tomorrow”. This message is significant only in a context
which specifies to whom ’I’ and ’you’ refer and on what day the message was carved. Ab-
sent such a context, the message is useless and so lacks pragmatic significance even though
its semantic role in English is perfectly clear. Supplying the context renders the message
verifiable.
11One might qualify this with ’approximately’, but the qualitative nature of the ascription
renders this irrelevant.
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expect is a contextual reduction of classical to quantum physics. But even this
would elude one in so far as at some stage the assumed context could not be
described within a significant application of quantum physics12.
7 Emergent Properties and Emergent Objects
Laloe¨ summarizes the essence of his (12) as follows
in some quantum situations where macroscopic systems populate
Fock states with well defined populations, the EPR argument be-
comes significantly stronger than in the historical example with two
microscopic particles. The argument speaks eloquently in favour of
a pre-existing relative phase of the two states ... but certainly not in
favour of the orthodox point of view where the phase appears during
the measurements. (p.51)
In spite of the objections I have lodged against his argument, Laloe¨ here
expresses an important insight that should not be lost if we wish to understand
the emergence of relative phase between BECs. The EPR argument was di-
rected against a popular version of the Copenhagen interpretation that takes
the quantum state to describe intrinsic properties of a system it represents, and
measurement to project the quantum state onto a new one that describes the
system’s new intrinsic properties. If one tries to understand the emergence of
relative phase between BECs initially in a double Fock state as a stochastic dy-
namical process mediated by successive projective measurements on individual
particles in the condensate, then, as Laloe¨ goes on to say, surprising non-local
effects appear in the macroscopic world (which, I might add, are extremely dif-
ficult to reconcile with relativistic spacetime structure, even though they do not
admit superluminal signalling).
Must one who rejects ths popular version of the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion conclude that the relative phase between BECs was definite already prior
to measurements on its constituent particles, which simply progressively reveal
that pre-existing phase Λ? Drawing this conclusion on the basis of EPR-type
reasoning, one would take Λ to be an additional variable characterizing the
BECs in quantum state (3), initially hidden but gradually revealed by trans-
verse spin measurements. But further investigations by Laloe¨ and Mullin(10)
effectively block this route. They derive (Bell-Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt)-
type inequalities for carefully chosen observables of particles in quantum state
(3) on the assumption of a pre-existing relative phase between the condensates,
12This train of thought may be what Landau and Lifshitz(38) had in mind when they said
”quantum mechanics occupies a very unusual place within physical theories: it
contains classical mechanics as a limiting case, yet at the same time it requires
this limiting case for its own formulation.” p.3
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and show that quantum mechanics predicts their violation in that state.13 So,
just as in the Bohm-EPR case, the intended conclusion of EPR-type reasoning
here proves to be incompatible with quantum mechanics itself.
There is a different way to use a pre-existing relative phase Λ to account for
the interference exhibited by a system of two similar condensates as a result of
transverse spin measurements. It is to deny that their initial quantum state is
correctly represented by (3), and to claim that it is rather a phase state (15).
The analysis of section 4 shows that these two quantum states lead to identical
interference patterns for the phenomena considered there. Of course, by taking
this line one is evading rather than solving the problem of understanding how
a relative phase emerges in the double Fock state (3). Such evasion could be
justified by an argument as to why any natural preparation procedure for a
system of condensates of the type we have been considering would give rise to
the phase state (15) instead. But if one recalls that the whole discussion of
interference between similar BECs was provoked by experiments like those of
Andrews et. al.(2), the prospects of developing such an argument seem bleak.
Leggett(21), for example, says this
The authors start with a trap which is split into two by a laser-
induced barrier so high that the single-atom tunnelling time between
the two wells is greater than the age of the universe. They then
condense clouds of 87Rb atoms independently in the two wells and
allow them to come to thermal equilibrium. At this point there
seems no doubt that the correct quantum mechanical wave-function
of the system is, schematically, [of the form of a double Fock state]
(p.138)
He goes on to show that the time-evolution of each component to bring them
into overlap after removal of the laser barrier will not make this double Fock
state approach a phase state. Laloe¨(12) argues that environmental decoherence
can favor phase states over double Fock states, but dismisses this as a reason
to reject his analysis in terms of double Fock states. Since coupling with the
environment tends to produce an improper mixture of phase states, if there is
any interference in a system like that analyzed, this cannot be accounted for by
appeal to a pure phase state of the BEC system.
It is interesting to contrast the case of a system of dilute gas BECs in a double
Fock state (3) with other systems involving a pair of condensates that exhibit
interference phenomena accounted for by appeal to a relative phase between
them. When a pair of conductors separated by a thin metal oxide junction is
cooled to become superconducting, a current flows across the junction even in
the absence of an applied voltage. This DC Josephson effect may be explained
quantum mechanically by appeal to a well-defined phase difference φ across
the junction in the wave-function representing the state of the system: the DC
13It is, however, noteworthy that experimental violation would be extraordinarily difficult
to arrange because it would be essential to perform measurements on all the particles in the
system of condensates.
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current is proportional to sinφ. Leggett and Sols(25) write the wave-function as
follows,
Φ ∼
(
|a| eiφ/2ψL + |b| e−iφ/2ψR
)N
(21)
where the system consists of N ”bosons” (Cooper pairs) and ψL (ψR) is the
Schro¨dinger amplitude for a boson to be on the left (right) of the junction.
Note the analogy with the phase state (15)14. If positing a phase state like
(21) is indeed the only way to explain the Josephson effect, then just as in the
case of the dilute gas BECs, one should ask how a relative phase emerges. One
possible answer is that there is always some relative phase difference between
any pair of similar superconductors (even those prepared independently and
arbitrarily far away from each other), and its (random) value emerges as a result
of spontaneous breaking of the U(1) symmetry. Leggett and Sols(25) reject this
answer, and Leggett(26) advances an interesting argument for doing so.
To set the context for this argument, note that the state (21) may be ex-
panded in a basis of double Fock states |Na, Nb〉 as
Φ ∼
+N/2∑
M=−N/2
|CM | eiMφ |Na, Nb〉 (22)
where (Na +Nb) = N and
|Na, Nb〉 ∼ aˆ†NaψL aˆ†
Nb
ψR
|0〉 (23)
It follows that in state (21) the difference between the number of bosons in
the left-hand condensate and the number in the right-hand condensate is in-
determinate, even though together they contain exactly N bosons. This may
be acceptable in the typical situation in which one takes (21) to represent the
state of a pair of similar condensates, prepared together and spatially separated
only by a thin junction. But it is harder to stomach if the left and right hand
condensates have been separately prepared in different continents!
Leggett(26) rejects this outre´ suggestion, and presents a thought experiment
as a reason for doing so.
The ”experiment” simply consists in weighing them at separate
times ... that can be arbitrarily far separated, so as to determine
the number difference [Na −Nb] at these times, without ever making
Josephson contact between them. (p.459)
If (21) correctly represents their total state, then there is no reason to expect
the results to agree: indeed, one would expect them to differ by an amount of
the order of N
1
2 . If, on the other hand, the correct representation is a double
Fock state (or mixture of these), then the results would be expected to agree
(within the margin of error of the experiment). Leggett(26) concludes
14Leggett and Sols (1991) actually apply their analysis to a generic Josephson effect in a
Bose superfluid, of which a superconductor is one example, another being superfluid Helium.
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I can see no reason whatever to doubt that it is this latter conclusion
which would be found experimentally, so that in this (operationally
defined) sense, the statement that ”two superfluids which have never
seen one another before nevertheless have a definite relative phase”
is, I believe, false. (ibid.)
But suppose we take spontaneous symmetry breaking absolutely seriously
here and consider what we should say if the results of Leggett’s thought experi-
ment were to confound his firm expectations. In that case, I submit, we should
have evidence for more than just the emergence of relative phase in BECs con-
sequent upon spontaneous symmetry breaking: we should have reason to accept
the spontaneous emergence of composite objects—the BECs themselves.
Here we have at least a conceptual possibility not (to my knowledge) con-
templated by philosophers interested in emergence. When philosophers have
considered the possibility of emergent objects, they have had in mind a case in
which an object composed of a perfectly determinate set of microscopic parts
possesses an emergent property (however that notion is analyzed).15 But what
we are presently contemplating is a case in which each of two objects, composed
of nothing but microscopic parts of a certain kind, contains no definite number
of these objects, although together the pair is composed of a definite number of
these constituent parts.
At first this may seem analogous to more familiar cases: consider a cat’s tail
and the rest of its body, Siamese twins, two colliding galaxies, or the stratosphere
and troposphere. But in such cases the parts of the total system are spatially
contiguous and the indeterminateness of composition of each where they join is
naturally attributed to the vagueness of the language we use to describe them.
If two similar BECs, independently prepared on different continents, had a
definite relative phase, then each BEC would be an emergent object in a much
stronger sense. The indeterminateness of composition could not be localized
to any spatially intermediate region and would be distributed equally among
all their component bosons. Perhaps we have here a new candidate for the
metaphysician’s disputed category of vague objects?
15See, for example, section 1 of Bedau(15) .
23
References
1. Anderson, M.H. et. al.: Observation of Bose-Einstein condensation in a
dilute atomic vapor. Science 269, 198-201 (1995)
2. Andrews, M.R., et. al.: Observation of interference between two Bose
condensates. Science 275, 637-641 (1997)
3. Laughlin, R.B. and Pines, D.: The theory of everything. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences 97, 28-31 (2000)
4. Morrison, M.: Emergence, reduction, and theoretical principles: Rethink-
ing fundamentalism. Philosophy of Science 73, 876-87 (2006)
5. Javanainen, J. and Yoo, S.M.: Quantum phase of a Bose-Einstein con-
densate with an arbitrary number of atoms. Physical Review Letters 76, 161-4
(1996)
6. Castin, Y. and Dalibard, J.: Relative phase of two Bose-Einstein conden-
sates. Physical Review A55, 4330-7 (1997)
7. Laloe¨, F.: The hidden phase of Fock states; quantum non-local effects.
The European Physics Journal D 33, 87-97 (2005)
8. Mullin, W.J., Krotkov, R. and Laloe¨, F.: Evolution of additional (hidden)
quantum variables in the interference of Bose-Einstein condensates. Physical
Review A74, 023610:1-11 (2006)
9. Mullin, W.J., Krotkov, R. and Laloe¨, F.: The origin of the phase in
the interference of Bose-Einstein condensates. American Journal of Physics 74,
880-87 (2006)
10. Laloe¨, F. and Mullin, W.J.: Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument and Bell
inequalities for Bose-Einstein spin condensates. Physical Review A77, 022108:1-
17 (2008)
11. Paraoanu, G.S.: Localization of the relative phase via measurements.
Journal of Low Temperature Physics 153, 285-93 (2008)
12. Laloe¨, F.: Bose-Einstein condensates and EPR quantum non-locality.
In: T.M. Nieuwenhuizen et. al. (eds.) Beyond the Quantum, pp. 35-52. World
Scientific, Singapore (2007)
13. Weinberg, S.: Dreams of a Final Theory. Random House, New York
(1992)
14. McLaughlin, B.: Emergence and supervenience. Intellectica 25, 25-43
(1997)
15. Bedau, M.: Downward causation and autonomy in weak emergence.
Principia Revista Internacional de Epistemologica 6, 5-50 (2003)
16. Humphreys, P.: How properties emerge. Philosophy of Science 64, 1-17
(1997)
17. Teller, P.: A contemporary look at emergence. In: Beckerman, A., Flohr,
H., and Kim, J. (eds.) Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of
Nonreductive Physicalism, pp. 139-53. de Gruyter, Berlin (1992)
18. Anderson, P.W.: More is different. Science 177, 393-396 (1972)
19. Weinberg, S.: The Quantum Theory of Fields II. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge (1996)
24
20. Wilson, M.: Wandering Significance. Oxford University Press, Oxford
(2006)
21. Leggett, A.J.: Quantum Liquids. Oxford University Press, Oxford
(2006)
22. Ruetsche, L.: Johnny’s so long at the ferromagnet. Philosophy of Science
73 [Proceedings], 473-486 (2006)
23. Goldstone, J., Salam, A. andWeinberg, S.: Broken Symmetries. Physical
Review 127, 965-70 (1962)
24. Streater, R.: The Heisenberg ferromagnet as a quantum field theory.
Communications in Mathematical Physics 6, 233-47 (1967)
25. Leggett, A.J. and Sols, F.: On the concept of spontaneously broken
gauge symmetry in condensed matter physics. Foundations of Physics 21, 353-
64 (1991)
26. Leggett, A.J.: Broken gauge symmetry in a Bose condensate. In: Griffin,
A., Snoke, D.W., and Stringari, S. (eds.) Bose-Einstein Condensation, pp. 452-
62. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1995)
27. Teller, P.: Relational holism and quantum mechanics. British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 37, 71-81 (1986)
28. Leggett, A.J.: Topics in the theory of the ultracold dilute alkali gases.
Modern Physics Letters B14 (Supplementary Issue), 1-42 (2000)
29. Einstein, A., Podolsky, B. and Rosen, N.: Can quantum-mechanical
description of physical reality be considered complete? Physical Review 47,
777-80 (1935)
30. Gisin, N.: Non-realism: deep thought or a soft option? arXiv:0901.4255v2
[quant-ph] 18 Aug 2009
31. Shimony, A.: Events and processes in the quantum world. In: Penrose,
R., and Isham, C. (eds.) Quantum Concepts in Space and Time, pp. 182-203.
Oxford University Press, Oxford (1986)
32. Maudlin, T.: Quantum Non-locality and Relativity. Blackwell, Oxford
(1994)
33. Einstein, A.: Physik und Realita¨t. Journal of the Franklin Institute 221,
313-347 (1936)
34. Einstein, A.: Quantenmechanik und Wirklichkeit, Dialectica 2, 320-4
(1948)
35. Einstein, A.: Autobiographical Notes. In: Schilpp, P.A. (ed.) Albert
Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, pp. 5-94. Open Court, La Salle, Illinois (1949)
36. Bohr, N.: Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be
considered complete? Physical Review 48, 696-702 (1935)
37. Bohr, N.: Discussion with Einstein on epistemological problems in
atomic physics. In: Schilpp, P.A. (ed.) Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist,
pp. 201-41. Open Court, La Salle, Illinois (1949)
38. Landau, L. D. and Lifshitz, E. M.: QuantumMechanics: Non-Relativistic
Theory, 3rd edition. Pergamon, Oxford (1977)
25
